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Abstract: This paper revisits the role of board size and composition in 
corporate governance using a measure of private benefits of control (PBC) 
as indicator of governance problems in firms. We calculate PBC using the 
voting premium approach for a sample of dual class stock companies trad-
ed on the Russian stock exchange between 1998 and 2009. Using fixed-
effects regressions, we find a quadratic relationship between PBC and 
board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) 
supervisory boards. This result is substantially stronger for PBC than for 
traditional measures of corporate performance. There is also some evi-
dence that director ownership helps mitigate governance problems. Most 
remarkably, we find that non-executive/independent directors are associat-
ed with larger PBC and thus do not seem to help improve corporate gov-
ernance. In contrast, regressions with accounting performance measures as 
dependent variables tend to suggest a positive role of these directors in 
corporate governance. 
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1. Introduction 
Agency theory views the conflict of interest between managers on the 
one hand, and providers of finance, most notably shareholders, on the other, 
as a key feature of the public corporation (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Among various corporate governance mechanisms, which aim to realign 
these interests, a crucial role is assigned to the board of directors (Tricker 
2012). The issues of board structure and processes, defined in terms of 
board size, presence of non-executive independent directors, separation of 
the posts of the chairman and the CEO, and establishment of various com-
mittees have been central to recent corporate governance debates and re-
forms (Nordberg 2011). In particular, reforms aimed at increasing the 
number of non-executive and independent directors in corporate boards 
have widely been adopted.
1
  
The empirical evidence concerning the effect of different board struc-
tures on corporate performance remains inconclusive regardless of whether 
it comes from the US, other developed economies or emerging markets. 
With respect to board size, a number of influential papers suggest that 
large boards are bad for company performance (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch 
1992, Yermack 1996, Conyon and Peck 1998). However, some recent 
studies find no robust relationship (e.g., Lehn, Patro, and Zhao 2009, Win-
toki, Linck, and Netter 2012), report a non-linear relationship (Andres and 
Vallelado 2008), or suggest a more nuanced picture (e.g., Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen 2008 according to which Tobin’s Q increases in board size for 
complex firms, but decreases for simple ones).  
Similarly, there is a lack of agreement regarding the role of independ-
ent and non-executive directors. Most studies based on US data find no sta-
tistically significant effect of board independence on corporate perfor-
mance (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Bhagat and Black 2002, and Winto-
ki et al. 2012). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) is among a few papers report-
ing a negative effect. Some studies suggest a positive role of independent 
directors (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
1999, Gupta and Fields 2009). The main cross-country study to date, 
Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) reports a positive effect of board 
independence on corporate value. However, Black, de Carvalho, and Gor-
ga (2012, p. 937) casts some doubts on the robustness of this result across 
countries by noting that “board independence predict higher market value 
in Korea, lower market value in Brazil and is insignificant in India”. 
                                                 
1
 For example, the OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) maintain that the board should have a suffi-
cient number of non-executive directors to ensure its independency from the executives; the UK corporate gov-
ernance code (2010) requires that at least half of board should comprise non-executive directors, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act requires the audit committees to consist solely of independent directors and both NYSE and 
NASDAQ oblige listed companies to have a majority of independent directors.  
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On the background of such mixed and inconclusive results based, for 
the most part, on market and accounting performance measures, Bebchuck 
and Weisbach (2010, p.944) note that “there is a growing body of empiri-
cal research indicating that director independence is associated with im-
proved decisions with respect to some specific types of decisions”. In par-
ticular, the effect is more pronounced in studies that focus on CEO turno-
ver, CEO compensation, as well as the incidence of fraud and opportunism. 
Several studies suggest a more nuanced link between board independence 
and corporate governance and performance. For example, Duchin, Matsu-
saka and Ozbas (2010) establish that outsider effectiveness varies with in-
formation costs and Masulis et al. (2012) find a positive effect of inde-
pendent directors when they have relevant industry experience.  
The available evidence shows that it may be particularly difficult to 
establish a relationship between board structure and corporate performance 
measured by traditional performance measures such as Tobin’s Q and fi-
nancial ratios based on accounting data. One possible reason is that these 
traditional performance measures may be subject to various external influ-
ences such as exogenous firm-specific and industry-specific shocks, may 
respond to governance problem with considerable lags, and may suffer 
from measurement problems (stemming, for example, from variations in 
accounting rules and practices) that are hard to control for in empirical 
analysis. The gradual shift of attention from traditional measures of corpo-
rate performance to “specific types of decisions” (in the words of Beb-
chuck and Weisbach) is, therefore, not an accident. A further step forward 
in this direction has recently been taken by Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 
(2013) who look inside the black box of corporate boards. Using the 
minutes of board meetings in Israeli firms, they evaluate board effective-
ness based on the information about what actually happens in the board-
room. 
This paper revisits the old question of how board structure, in particu-
lar, the size and composition, affects corporate governance and perfor-
mance, but from a rather unusual angle. We link key characteristics of cor-
porate boards to a measure of private benefits of control (PBC), in addition 
to and above traditional measures of company performance. Theoretically, 
PBC capture pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits that a party in control 
over the firm can extract without sharing them with other shareholders and 
can, therefore, be regarded as a direct indicator of governance problems in 
firms (see Dyck and Zingales 2004; Baulkaran, Amoako-Adu, and Smith 
2012). We estimate PBC using the voting premium approach, which relates 
prices of voting and non-voting stocks in dual class stock companies. This 
is the key innovation and contribution of our paper to the corporate finance 
7 
 
and governance literature. To our best knowledge, no other studies have 
thus far examined the link between corporate board structure and private 
benefits of control.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on Russia, which is not an accident. 
Firstly, Russia has long been regarded as country with extreme corporate 
governance problems. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), managers 
and/or controlling shareholders of Russian companies had immense oppor-
tunities for diverting both profits and assets to themselves. Goetzmann, 
Spiegel, and Ukhov (2003) even labeled Russia “a Wild West of corporate 
control”. At the same time, the country has also been known for considera-
ble variation in corporate governance practices across firms and dynamic 
changes in firms’ governance structure (e.g., Black 2001). The scope and 
variation, both across companies and over time, of governance problems 
makes Russia a useful laboratory of corporate governance (Dyck et al. 
2008, Black, Love, and Rachinsky 2006). Secondly, our paper takes ad-
vantage of the considerable number of dual-class stock firms (those issuing 
voting and non-voting shares) traded on the Russian stock market. This 
gives us a large sample of firms for which a measure of private benefits of 
control can easily be computed. Thirdly, we exploit the fact that most Rus-
sian dual class stock companies were created not because of the desire of 
their founders to retain control over productive assets while obtaining ex-
ternal financing, but because of the specific design of the Russian privati-
zation, which is a truly exogenous factor. Thus, the sample selection issue 
does not apply or at least is of much smaller concern in our study as com-
pared with studies of mature stock markets. These three prominent features 
of the country’s corporate sector strengthen the internal validity of our 
study. A further strength of our analysis is that we compare and discuss the 
results for PBC, our key dependent variable, with those for traditional 
measures of corporate performance, such as Tobin’s Q and ROE. Finally, 
we contribute to the still limited evidence on the role of board of directors 
in one of the largest emerging economies.
2
   
Our analysis is based on a novel hand-collected dataset of Russian du-
al stock companies that combines the 1998-2009 share trade data from the 
Russian Trading System (RTS) stock exchange with additional information 
from companies’ charters and quarterly reports to the Federal Financial 
Market Service (FFMS). Overall, we have at our disposal an unbalanced 
panel of more than 100 firms observed over 12 years, with about 1000 ob-
servations in total. Based on fixed-effects regressions, our econometric 
                                                 
2
 Previous studies on Russia include Blasi and Shleifer (1996), Muravyev (2003), Iwasaki (2008), and Frye and 
Iwasaki (2011). See also a recent report by the PwC prepared for the OECD roundtable on corporate governance 
in Russia (PwC 2012).  
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analysis suggests a quadratic relationship between PBC and board size, 
implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) boards. This 
result appears to be substantially stronger for PBC than for traditional 
measures of corporate performance, in particular ROE. There is some evi-
dence that director ownership (at low levels at least) helps mitigate gov-
ernance problems. Most remarkably, our study contributes to the ongoing 
debate on the role of independent and/or non-executive directors in corpo-
rate governance. According to our results, non-executive/independent di-
rectors in Russia are associated with larger PBC, and thus do not help im-
prove corporate governance. In contrast, regressions with traditional per-
formance measures tend to suggest a positive role of these directors in ad-
dressing governance problems. We attempt to explain and reconcile these 
non-trivial findings at the end of our analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides nec-
essary institutional background regarding the organization of corporate 
boards and specifics of dual class stock companies in Russia. Section 3 de-
scribes the methodological approach. Section 4 describes the data and 
sample used in the paper. The estimation results are presented and dis-
cussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Institutional background  
2.1. Corporate boards in the governance structure of Russian 
companies 
Key features of the governance structure of Russian companies are set 
in the Civil Code adopted in 1994 and in the Federal Law “On joint-stock 
companies” N 208 FZ passed in 1995, with numerous changes and 
amendments in both since then. There are additional regulations adopted 
by government and its agencies, as well as by stock exchanges, some of 
which are optional. The most prominent example of the latter is the Corpo-
rate Governance Code recommended by Russia’s Federal Commission on 
Securities Markets (see FCSM 2002). Introduced in 2002, the Code pro-
vides a set of voluntary commitments by corporate stakeholders, including 
shareholders and managers of companies. 
As in most countries of the world, the highest governing body of firms 
incorporated in Russia is a general shareholder meeting. A company 
should hold at least one such meeting per year (called annual shareholder 
meeting), no earlier than 2 months and no later than 6 months after the end 
of a fiscal year (which corresponds to the calendar year). All other meet-
ings are considered extraordinary. The power of shareholder meetings is, 
however, severely restricted to passing changes in and amendments to the 
corporate charter, approval of reorganization and liquidation of the compa-
ny, approval of dividends and of annual financial reports, appointment of 
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auditors, and election of other governance bodies, in particular, the board 
of directors (supervisory council).
3
  
The board of directors is responsible for the overall governance of the 
company and acts under the authority granted to it by law and the corpo-
rate charter. In particular, the board of directors is responsible for setting 
priorities for company operations, convening general shareholder meetings 
and setting their agenda, deciding on bond issues, putting forward recom-
mendations on the amount of dividends, and other matters. Importantly, the 
board of directors has no executive functions. According to Russian corpo-
rate law, companies are managed by a unitary executive body (CEO, or 
“general director” in Russian) or by CEO and a collective executive body 
(management board). In the latter case, law explicitly requires companies 
to define, in their corporate charters, the authority of the collective execu-
tive body. Depending on the corporate charter, the appointment and dis-
missal of the executive body may be the responsibility of either the board 
of directors or the shareholder meeting.  
Russian corporate law contains provisions regulating the size and 
composition of corporate supervisory boards as well as the procedure of 
their election (article 66 of the Federal Law “On joint-stock companies”). 
The key regulations are summarized below: 
 The minimum number of directors is set at the level of five 
(the norm applies since 2004). In addition, companies with more than 
10,000 voting shareholders must have no fewer than 9 directors, and 
companies with 1,000 to 10,000 shareholders must have at least 7 di-
rectors.
4
  
 Only natural persons can be elected to the board of directors 
(in contrast to the CEO which may be a legal person, so-called 
“managing organization”). 
 Members of the board of directors are elected at a shareholder 
meeting for the period until the next annual shareholder meeting. 
Board members may be reelected unlimited number of times. These 
norms imply that staggered boards are not allowed in Russia. 
 The board is elected by cumulative voting, which ensures rep-
resentation of small blockholders. Under cumulative voting, the 
number of votes of each shareholder is multiplied by the number of 
                                                 
3
 In companies with fewer than 50 shareholders the functions of the supervisory board can be performed by the 
shareholder meeting.  
4
 In the analysis that follows we do not explore this potential source of variation in board size because the over-
whelming majority companies in our sample are former state owned enterprises, which usually have thousands 
of atomistic shareholders due to the design of the Russian mass privatization. The legal restriction largely affects 
new private firms that recently entered the Russian stock market.    
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directors on the board; all these votes can be cast for one or several 
candidates running for the election.   
 Russian corporate law explicitly bans CEO duality. However, 
although the CEO cannot chair the board of directors, she may be 
(and in the overwhelming majority of cases is) among its members. 
 If a company has a collective executive body (management 
board), its members cannot occupy more than 25% of seats on the 
board of directors.  
Among optional norms, the most important is the Corporate Govern-
ance Code recommendation for companies to have at least three independ-
ent directors so that they account for no less than one-fourth of the board 
membership (Section 2.2.3). The Code also provides the definition of in-
dependent directors. See FCSM (2002) for further details. 
2.2. Dual class stock companies in Russia 
Dual class shares were authorized in Russia in 1992, when a major 
presidential decree on privatization was enacted.
5
 This document estab-
lished three basic options for privatizing large and medium-sized state-
owned enterprises, which were to be transformed into joint-stock compa-
nies. It also provided a standard corporate charter, which all privatized 
companies had to adopt. According to the decree, enterprises that followed 
the so-called “option 1” of privatization were re-established as companies 
with up to 25% of their charter capital represented by non-voting (pre-
ferred) shares and the rest represented by voting (common) shares.
6
 The 
other two options (“option 2” and “option 3”) did not envisage the issue of 
non-voting stocks. The equity of companies that followed these options 
was formed by common shares only. 
Various sources suggest that that “insiders” (managers and workers, 
the key players at the first stage of the privatization process) preferred pri-
vatizing their firms in 1992-1994 using “option 2” and “option 3”, which 
would give them full control (the majority of common stock). These insid-
ers resorted to “option 1”, which would split the firms’ equity between vot-
ing and non-voting stock and would give them non-voting shares for free, 
only when they did not have enough funds to purchase the firms’ assets, 
evaluated at their book value as of 1992. This was typical of large and cap-
ital intensive firms (see Boycko et al. 1995, Hare and Muravyev 2003). A 
                                                 
5
 See Presidential Decree No. 721 dated 1 July 1992 “On organizational measures on transformation of state en-
terprises and voluntary associations of state enterprises into joint-stock companies”. 
6
 The term “preferred shares” is a direct translation from Russian (Federal Law “On joint-stock companies”). As 
explained below, these shares are rather different from what is usually meant by preferred stock in mature stock 
markets. In fact, Goetzmann et al. (2003) call Russian preferred shares “preferred common shares”. Importantly, 
these “preferred common shares” are the only way for the departure from the one share – one vote principle in 
Russia. The country’s corporate low forbids any differentiation in cash flow rights or voting rights among the 
usual common stock.   
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number of studies treat the method of privatization as an exogenous factor 
with regard to the performance of firms and even uses it as an instrument 
for the firms’ post-privatization ownership structure (e.g., Earle and Estrin 
1997). Overall, the existing literature does not suggest any mechanism by 
which the use of “option 1” (the issue of dual class stock) in the process of 
privatization is related to the magnitude of private benefits of control. We 
therefore build on this literature to claim that the selection issue (the choice 
of dual class stock structure by Russian companies) is of no or little im-
portance in our analysis. This feature is rarely observed in mature stock 
markets where dual class stock structures are usually created for a reason, 
such as attracting external finance without jeopardizing control over the 
firms. 
The legal status of the two classes of shares, common and preferred, 
was initially specified in the standard corporate charter. The rights at-
tached to common (voting) stock were quite similar to those existing in 
most other jurisdictions (they are basically restricted to the right to vote at 
shareholder meetings and the right to receive dividends, which are indefi-
nite). The status of preferred shares was, in contrast, rather peculiar. While 
sharing a number of essential features with common shares, they did not 
confer general voting rights but instead provided a few pecuniary privileg-
es to their owners. These included superior dividend rights (in particular, 
the dividend on preferred shares was bounded below by the dividend on 
common stocks), superior rights in the event of company liquidation, as 
well as temporary enfranchisement of preferred shares in the case the divi-
dend on them was not paid or was not paid in full. The standard charter al-
so endowed preferred shareholders with the right to vote on all decisions 
that involved their “class rights”. Effectively, preferred shareholders were 
granted veto power on decisions that concerned their class rights as such 
decisions required a supermajority (two-thirds) approval by these investors.  
Since the start of Russia’s privatization, there have been several 
changes in both the country’s corporate law and individual corporate char-
ters concerning the legal status of preferred shares (see Muravyev 2013 for 
details). However, the basic principle that preferred shares do not vote but 
are instead entitled to a superior dividend has largely remained intact. Thus, 
the differentiation of voting rights across classes – a deviation from the one 
share - one vote rule – has been retained. This is crucial for estimating pri-
vate benefits of control based on the prices of common and preferred 
shares.
7
 For Russia, this has been previously done by Goetzmann et al. 
                                                 
7
 Ideally, the two types of stock should be identical and differ only with respect to their voting rights. This is 
rarely observed in the real world, however. For example, Zingales (1995, p.1057) in his US study notes that “on-
ly 21 companies have nonvoting common stock. In all other cases both classes are voting, but their voting power 
differs. The majority of companies (57) attribute ten votes to the superior voting class and one to the inferior 
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(2003), Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007), and Muravyev (2013), among 
others. The approach is thus considered valid in the literature, despite some 
differences in the rights attached to common and preferred shares (apart 
from the voting right). 
There have been more than 200 dual class stock companies traded on 
the Russian stock market, with the earliest trades of non-voting stock on 
the RTS
8
 dating back to September 1996. The average voting premium has 
varied a great deal between 1998 and 2009, with the highest values 
achieved right after the 1998 financial crisis (Muravyev 2009). The high 
magnitudes of the voting premium, often above 100%, suggest large pri-
vate benefits and significant risks of minority shareholder expropriation in 
Russian firms, which is consistent with casual evidence of poor investor 
protection in the country.  
3. Methodology 
In the empirical analysis that follows, we relate key variables charac-
terizing supervisory boards to the voting premium, which is our measure of 
private benefits of control.
9
 In the most general form, the corresponding 
econometric model can be written as follows: 
VPit = αi + Xitβ + Zitγ + t  + it      (1) 
where subscripts i and t index firms and time, respectively, the de-
pendent variable VPit is the voting premium, αi is a time-invariant firm-
specific effect (which captures unobserved time-invariant characteristics of 
firm i), vector Xit includes essential characteristics of the firm’s superviso-
ry board, including size, director ownership, and the presence of independ-
ent and/or non-executive directors, vector Zit includes conventional control 
variables, such as firm size, as well as characteristics of the managing body 
(for example, whether there is a management board in the company or the 
company is run by the CEO), t denote time effects common to all firms, 
and it stands for random disturbance. As the previous literature contains 
some evidence of non-linear relationships between board characteristics 
and corporate performance (e.g., Mura 2007, Coles et al. 2008), we con-
sider quadratic specifications in these variables alongside linear ones. In 
specification (1), vector of coefficients β is of our primary interest.  
                                                                                                                                                        
voting class.” Also, in many companies “…inferior voting shares have the right to elect a minority of directors.” 
In other jurisdictions, non-voting stocks may be truly non-voting, but superior in terms of cash flow rights. What 
really matters, however, is the deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule, regardless of how it is introduced. 
Israeli companies, for example, used to introduce such deviation by issuing shares which were entitled to one 
vote each but had different par values and hence, provided different dividends (Levy 1983). 
8
 The RTS was the first electronic trading system in Russia established in September 1995. It was transformed 
into the RTS Stock Exchange in 1997 and finally merged with the MICEX at the end of 2011. 
9
 The alternative approach for measuring private benefits of control (the control premium approach), which is 
based on comparing prices of shares in transactions involving control block change and prices of shares in the 
stock market after the announcement of such control block sales (e.g., Barclay and Holderness 1989), is not used 
in the paper due to data constraints. 
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Following the international literature, we define the voting premium 
as the difference between the price of common shares and the price of pre-
ferred shares divided by the price of preferred shares (e.g., Zingales 1995, 
Benos and Weisbach 2004).
10
 Theoretical models suggest, however, that 
the voting premium, if taken at face value, provides only an imperfect 
measure of the private benefits. Indeed, the model by Zingales (1995) 
shows that the voting premium is affected, in addition to private benefits of 
control, by the likelihood of a control fight over the firm as well as by the 
proportion of voting shares in the company’s equity.11  In fact, Doidge 
(2004) mentions such confoundedness as a key shortcoming of the voting 
premium as a measure of private benefits.  
 While some authors have considered, based on various assumptions, 
several adjustments to the usual formula of the voting premium in order to 
make it closer to the true value of private benefits (see, e.g., Nenova 2003 
and Doidge 2004), our approach is different. We include key variables 
identified in previous studies on determinants of the voting premium as 
additional controls in the regressions. The idea here is to eliminate any po-
tential spurious correlation between the voting premium on the one hand, 
and board characteristics on the other hand if these latter factors are corre-
lated, for whatever reason, with other determinants of the voting premium, 
such as the likelihood of a control fight over the firm. This is also a more 
traditional approach in the literature. Indeed, according to Albuquerque 
and Schrot (2010, p.33) “[c]urrent approaches to estimating private bene-
fits of control rely on empirical proxies, such as the block premium or the 
voting premium, and on the use of control variables to remove from these 
proxies aspects unrelated to private benefits of control”. 
 We therefore add to vector Z a set of additional control variables that 
include a proxy for the probability of a control fight, the proportion of vot-
                                                 
10
 An important advantage of the dependent variable chosen is that it helps eliminate from the analysis the effect 
of many firm-specific and industry-specific shocks, which impact on traditional measures of corporate perfor-
mance, such as Tobin’s Q. To give an example, a substantial increase in oil prices is likely to positively affect 
the values of both common and preferred shares of the oil sector companies. As the computation of the voting 
premium uses the difference between the prices of the two classes of stock, much of the effect of increased oil 
prices is differenced away. This is not the case with Tobin’s Q. An oil price rally would raise Tobin’s Q of com-
panies belonging to the oil extraction industry relative to firms from other sectors. Obviously, such an increase 
has nothing to do with better corporate governance in the oil sector companies.   
11
 In particular, VP = Φ(B/y)(1/π), where B/y is the size of the private benefits of control relative to the value of 
investors’ cash flow rights, Φ is the probability of a control contest over the firm, and π is the fraction of the vot-
ing stock in its equity. The probability Φ of a contested tender offer directly depends on the ownership structure 
of companies: it is essentially zero if a company has a majority shareholder, positive but small if there is one 
large owner and all other shareholders are small, and large when there are multiple large shareholders with simi-
lar stakes while the remaining shares are distributed among small owners. In empirical studies, Φ is usually 
proxied by the Shapley value.  
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ing shares in the company’s equity, and a measure of liquidity.12 Finally, 
given some variation in the characteristics of Russian preferred shares 
across companies, we consider several control variables specific to the 
Russian case. These include dummies for the temporary enfranchisement 
of preferred shares and compulsory allocation of 10% of net profit to divi-
dends on preferred shares, among other variables (see Muravyev 2009 for 
details).  
 We also estimate a set of regressions with traditional measures of 
corporate performance on the left-hand-side in lieu of the voting premium. 
In the general form, the corresponding econometric model can be written 
as follows: 
PERFit = αi + Xitβ + Witγ + t  + it      (2) 
where PERFit stands for either the Market-to-Book ratio, Tobin’s Q, 
ROE, ROA or SGA and vector Wit denotes a set of control variables used 
in similar specifications (e.g., firm size, leverage, ownership of the first 
and second largest owners). The Market-to-Book ratio is conventionally 
defined as the market value of a firm’s equity divided by the book value of 
equity. Due to data constraints, we approximate Tobin’s Q, which usually 
relates the market value of a firm to the replacement value of its assets, by 
the ratio of the market value of equity and book value of long-term debt to 
the book value of equity and long-term debt. We calculate ROE as the ratio 
of net profit to equity, and ROA as the ratio of taxable profit to assets. 
SGA is defined as sales, general, and administrative expenses divided by 
sales revenues. As proposed in the literature, this variable reflects manage-
rial discretionary expenses and may serve as proxy for agency costs (Singh 
and Davidson 2003). 
It is well known that accounting-based performance measures may re-
act to changes in the governance structure with substantial delays as com-
pared with market-based performance indicators (e.g., Carton and Hofer 
2006). Therefore, in addition to contemporaneous effects of governance 
variables we consider their effects on accounting-based performance 
measures one year ahead. In other words, the governance variables are 
lagged by one year with respect to the performance measures. 
 The regression models (1) and (2) include time-invariant effects αi, 
firm fixed effects, which capture unobserved time-invariant characteristics 
of firm i, such as industry affiliation and location.
13
 The firm fixed effects 
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mitigate endogeneity concerns, specifically those arising when some of the 
characteristics of corporate boards are correlated with omitted characteris-
tics of firms (which, in turn, affect the dependent variable). However, we 
acknowledge that fixed-effects specifications do not necessarily eliminate 
all potential problems related to regressor endogeneity broadly understood 
as correlation of the error term with the regressors. In particular, this ap-
proach does not address the issues of potential measurement error and re-
versed causation. Therefore, we admit that the estimated coefficients β do 
not necessarily have a causal interpretation.
14
  
 As regards inference, we rely on the cluster robust estimator of var-
iance with clustering by firms. This takes care of potential violations of the 
assumption that standard errors it are independently and identically dis-
tributed. In particular, it ensures that the standard errors are correct when 
observations are independent across firms, but not necessarily within firms. 
4. Data and sample 
Our analysis is based on a novel hand-collected dataset of publicly 
traded Russian companies that have issued dual class stocks. Specifically, 
the sample embraces all companies whose common and preferred shares 
were listed/traded on the RTS Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2009. 
The choice of the RTS (and not MICEX or any other stock exchange) is 
motivated by the wider coverage of the RTS, with more than 100 dual class 
stock companies traded there as early as the late 1990s.
15
 We exclude from 
the sample banks and other companies from the financial sector. We also 
drop a handful of companies with convertible preferred shares (which have 
voting premia close to zero) as well as a few companies whose preferred 
shares are entitled to a fixed dividend, not related to the dividend on com-
mon stock (these preferred shares are thus similar to corporate bonds). We 
also exclude observations with negative equity, which is standard in finan-
cial studies. 
From the RTS web-site (http://www.rts.ru) we obtain daily data on 
share trade for all sampled companies. These data are supplemented with 
information on ownership and characteristics of shares from companies’ 
quarterly reports to the Federal Financial Market Service (FFMS, previous-
ly the Federal Commission on Securities Market, FCSM). These data have 
                                                                                                                                                        
other regressors, which is usually hard to justify. As will be shown later, the Hausman specification test rejects 
the RE estimator in most of the specifications used in our study.  
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 We cannot advance in addressing this problem because the data at hand contain no reliable instruments for key 
corporate governance variables. Still, our analysis is an improvement over many studies of emerging markets 
based on cross-sectional data (e.g., Iwasaki 2008 and Black et al. 2012).  
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the measurement of stock prices are less important as cross-market differences in prices are being consistently 
eliminated by arbitrageurs.  
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been assembled from the SKRIN and SPARK databases (www.skrin.ru, 
http://spark.interfax.ru) which collect and process original reports submit-
ted by Russian joint-stock companies to the FFMS and statistical agencies. 
We use second quarter reports (usually prepared by companies in early Ju-
ly), which ensures that the data reflect the results of general shareholder 
meetings held at the beginning of each year (e.g., the appointment of new 
CEOs, boards of directors, etc.).  
The SKRIN and SPARK databases provide a large array of variables 
characterizing various aspects of firms’ operations. In particular, we have 
access to information on the distribution of ownership among large share-
holders (the reporting threshold in Russia is 5%)
16
, ownership stakes of af-
filiated persons (including the CEO and other directors, regardless of the 
size of their stakes), and composition of corporate boards (including name, 
age, tenure, and positions held during the last five years). Using these 
sources, we have assembled a dataset that contains the most important var-
iables describing corporate ownership patterns, size and composition of 
corporate supervisory boards, as well as characteristics of CEOs and, 
where relevant, management boards. In addition, we have information on 
industry affiliation, the number of employees, and key financial indicators 
of the firms. Overall, the dataset at our disposal is an unbalanced annual 
panel of 190 companies during 12 years (1998-2009) with 1021 observa-
tions in total. The definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
are provided in Table 1 below. Table 2 shows their descriptive statistics.  
Most of the sampled firms are large and extra-large companies (with 
4700 employees on average) and belong to three industries: power utilities, 
oil & gas industry, and telecommunications (see Figure 1). This is hardly a 
surprise given the specifics of privatization of these sectors, in which “op-
tion 1” heavily prevailed (see Hare and Muravyev 2003). The number of 
companies observed in a given year is shown in Figure 2. Two particular 
episodes generate considerable variation in the composition of the sample, 
namely the reorganization of the telecommunications sector in 2002-3 and 
of the power utilities sector in the second half of the decade. In the former 
case, there was a wave of mergers of regional telecommunication compa-
nies, with the number of telecoms in the sample dropping from 64 in 2002 
to a mere 12 in 2003. In the latter case, there was a series of splits of local 
monopolies into power generating and distribution companies, with a wave 
of horizontal mergers in the sector shortly thereafter. The latter are reflect-
ed in the hike in the number of observations in 2006 and drop in the num-
ber of observations in 2008. As both reforms were implemented by gov-
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ernment decisions, the time variation in the number of companies has noth-
ing do to with the dependent variables. Overall, there is little selectivity in 
the sample attrition pattern, and the unbalancedness of the panel is, there-
fore, of little importance in our analysis. 
The data in Table 2 show that the average voting premium for the 
whole period of observation is equal to 1.13 or 113%.
17
 This is large by in-
ternational standards. Indeed, Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003) note that, in 
most stock markets, the premium tends to remain in single or low double 
digits. Figure 3 shows that the premium in Russia varied considerably over 
time, being higher in the post-crisis periods (1999 and 2009) as compared 
with other years. This is consistent with greater incentives to expropriate 
minority investors in bad states of nature, when investment opportunities 
are scarce (Lemmon and Lins 2003). Other dependent variables have plau-
sible magnitudes.
18
 The mean values of the Market-to-Book ratio and To-
bin’s Q are close to unity.19 The mean ROE and ROA are around 9%, and 
SGA amounts to 6% of sales revenues, on average. 
Table 2 also provides key characteristics of the supervisory boards and 
managing bodies. These data are gathered with particular care, especially 
as regards identification of non-executive and independent directors. To 
this end, we have studied quarterly reports of the sampled companies and 
also resorted to additional sources, such as business newspapers, in a num-
ber of uncertain cases. Although the quarterly reports do not directly classi-
fy directors as either executive, non-executive, or independent, they pro-
vide a wealth of information regarding directors’ current and past positions 
within and outside the firm as well as regarding their ownership stakes in 
the firm. In identifying independent directors, we rely on the definition in 
the Russian Corporate Governance Code. A director is considered non-
executive if she does not hold a managerial position in the firm and, at the 
same time, is not independent. According to our definitions, independent 
and non-executive directors are separate non-overlapping categories. The 
details of our approach are provided in Appendix 1. 
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According to the data shown in Table 2, the boards have, on average, 
nine directors. The share of directors who are either independent or non-
executive is above two-thirds. However, only 10% of directors can be clas-
sified as independent. Members of the board (excluding, where relevant, 
the CEO) have, cumulatively, 0.51% stake in the company. Only about 
13% of them are women. 
In one-third of the sampled companies, there is no management board. 
In these cases, key decisions are made by the CEO, unitary executive body. 
In 9% of the cases the CEO is a legal person.
20
 CEO ownership stakes are 
fairly small, just 0.42%, on average. The average tenure of the CEOs is just 
below 4 years. While this is low by international standards, in interpreting 
these data one needs to take into account several reorganizations of com-
panies and whole sectors during the period under study. Overall, the data 
contain considerable variation in the governance variables, which helps 
econometric identification. 
The overwhelming majority of the sampled companies have control-
ling shareholders, which is consistent with prior evidence of highly con-
centrated ownership in Russia. Note that employee ownership, even if it 
was substantial in some firms at the end of the 1990s, is of little relevance 
in our analysis of corporate governance. This is because employees only 
held preferred (non-voting) shares due to the privatization under “option 1”. 
The sampled firms’ equity consists, on average, of 21% preferred shares 
and 79% common shares. Common shares appear to be somewhat more 
liquid than preferred ones as variables Liquidity_comm and Liquidity_pref 
suggest. Overall, these descriptive statistics are very much in line with 
those from other studies of corporate governance in Russia, e.g., Kuz-
netsov and Muravyev (2001), Iwasaki (2007), Lazareva, Rachinsky and 
Stepanov (2007), and Chernykh (2008). 
 Finally, Table 3 shows pairwise raw correlations between the de-
pendent variables used in the regression analysis. As might be expected, 
the voting premium, measure of private benefits of control, is negatively 
correlated with the Market-to-Book ratio, Tobin’s Q, and ROE. These cor-
relations are significant at 1%, 1%, and 10% levels, respectively. The cor-
relation coefficient of the voting premium with ROA is negative, but mar-
ginally statistically insignificant. In other words, larger private benefits are 
associated with poorer corporate performance. The Market-to-Book ratio, 
Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA are all closely related, with correlation coeffi-
cients being greater than 0.25 and significant at the 1% level. SGA is posi-
tively and statistically significantly correlated with all performance 
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measures save the voting premium, where the correlation coefficient is in-
significant. One-year-ahead accounting performance measures are uncorre-
lated with the voting premium (for ROE, the correlation is marginally in-
significant), but are closely related to each other. 
5. Empirical results 
The empirical analysis proceeds as follows. For each dependent varia-
ble, we start with the most parsimonious baseline specification that con-
tains only three key variables characterizing corporate boards, namely the 
number of directors, share of non-executive directors, and share of inde-
pendent directors. This is the baseline, specification 1. Then we consider 
specification 2 which introduces a quadratic in board size. Next, we in-
clude two additional characteristics of corporate boards available in our da-
ta, the total ownership stake of directors (excluding the CEO) and share of 
male directors on the board. Specification 4 considers a quadratic in direc-
tor ownership stake. Finally, specifications 5 and 6 add essential character-
istics of CEOs. In particular, specification 5 introduces a dummy for a uni-
tary executive body (no management board) in the company, a dummy for 
the CEO being a legal person, as well as two continuous variables for CEO 
tenure and ownership. In specification 6 we consider a quadratic in CEO 
ownership. The principal estimation method is the fixed-effects estimator. 
We start with the presentation of the key results for the voting premium 
and then turn to the analysis of traditional measures of corporate perfor-
mance. 
5.1. Results for the voting premium 
Table 4 shows the first set of results in which the voting premium, our 
proxy for private benefits of control, is the dependent variable. We employ 
the log transformation of the voting premium variable because it is sug-
gested by theoretical models (e.g., Zingales 1995; see also footnote 10 in 
this paper) and also makes its distribution, which is skewed to the right, 
considerably more symmetric. For space reasons, here and later we only 
report the coefficients on the corporate governance variables that are of 
primary interest in our study.
21
 
Column 1 shows the estimation results for the baseline specification. 
We observe positive and statistically significant coefficients on the shares 
of both non-executive and independent directors (variables 
Non_exec_share and Independ_share) and an insignificant coefficient on 
board size (variable Board_size). The result is non-trivial. Non-executive 
and independent directors turn out to be associated with larger private ben-
efits of control, not smaller ones. This is contrary to the whole purpose of 
appointing such directors to corporate boards. Indeed, they are supposed to 
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play the role of monitors of the executives, restricting their opportunities to 
extract control benefits. It is also noteworthy that the coefficient on inde-
pendent directors is almost twice as large as that on other non-executives. 
Thus, it is independent directors who are particularly strongly associated 
with private benefits of control in Russia. 
Column 2 reports the results from the specification that includes a 
quadratic in board size. Interestingly, we observe a well-defined non-linear 
relationship: private benefits tend first to decline and then to grow with 
board size. The turning point is at about 11 directors, which is slightly 
above the sample mean for board size (9 directors). This is broadly in line 
with the idea of the optimality of medium-sized boards. It should be em-
phasized though, that this result pertains to the governance system domi-
nated by two-tier boards (only 33% of the sampled companies do not have 
a management board). Therefore, one needs to be cautious in comparing 
this finding with and generalizing it to the context of unitary boards. 
The regression in Column 3 indicates no significant effects of the 
share of males on the board as well as of director ownership. We further 
test for the latter effect by including a quadratic in director ownership in 
the specification shown in Column 4. The coefficient on the squared value 
turns out to be significant and the F-test shows that both coefficients on di-
rector ownership are jointly statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value 
0.029). The U-shaped pattern implies that an increase in director ownership 
has a negative effect on private benefits when director ownership is rela-
tively small, below 3.3%. Beyond this threshold, private benefits of control 
tend to rise with director ownership. Note though, that the turning point is 
quite far in the right tail of the distribution of director ownership (the 95% 
percentile is just 2.19). It is therefore more appropriate to speak about a 
negative, albeit diminishing effect of director ownership on private benefits 
of control. Importantly, the coefficients on the variables characterizing 
board size and composition are barely affected by the inclusion of addi-
tional variables in specifications 3 and 4 as compared with the results 
shown in Column 2. 
The results reported in Columns 5 and 6 suggest that private benefits 
of control are smaller when the company is managed by a unitary execu-
tive body, CEO, as opposed to a management board.
22
 We do not observe 
any effect of CEO ownership on the magnitude of private benefits. This 
holds in the linear and quadratic specifications. Once again, the coeffi-
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cients on the board size and composition variables remain almost identical 
to those reported in Columns 2-4. 
An important question is whether the results reported in Table 4 can 
reflect the specific definition of the dependent variable, namely the use of 
imputed share prices (from ask and bid quotations) instead of actual prices 
(footnote 16). Although Muravyev (2013) illustrates the feasibility of the 
former approach, at least, in the Russian context, an extra check may be 
warranted. This is done in the regressions shown in Table 5. Here, the vot-
ing premium is computed based on the average prices registered in actual 
transactions taking place on the RTS between May and August each year. 
The new variable is closely related to our main measure for the voting 
premium (the correlation coefficient is 0.94). As might be expected, more 
than half of the observations are lost because of the infrequent trading of 
Russian stocks. Despite the considerable loss of the degrees of freedom, 
the new set of results in Table 5 reinforces our previous findings. In partic-
ular, we still observe a U-shaped pattern for board size, with the dip in pri-
vate benefits at about 11 directors. We also observe a positive association 
between the share of independent and other non-executive directors on the 
one hand and the voting premium on the other. The magnitudes of these 
effects even become larger as compared with those in Table 4. As before, 
the association of the voting premium with independent directors is strong-
er than with non-executives who are not independent. 
Another issue is whether alternative estimation methods, such as 
pooled OLS and random-effects (RE) regressions, can be superior to the 
fixed-effects regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5. This is not a meaning-
less question. The fixed-effects estimator uses only the within variation in 
the data and ignores all the between variation. As a result, the coefficients 
on time-invariant regressors cannot be estimated. Worse, the estimator may 
provide very imprecise estimates when the within variation in the data ex-
ists, but is very tiny (driven by a few firms only) and possibly reflects 
noise in the data. We re-estimate the regressions in Table 4 using the RE 
estimator (see Appendix 2). In this set of regressions, we still observe a 
positive effect of independent directors (and, to a lesser extent, of other 
non-executives) on private benefits of control. But the coefficients on the 
other governance variables, including board size, lose significance. As is 
standard in panel data analysis we resort to the key specification test, 
Hausman test for the consistency of the RE estimator. The test strongly re-
jects the RE estimator in 5 out of 6 cases. Essentially, the test results mean 
that the key assumption underlying the RE estimator, namely that compa-
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ny-specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors does not hold. The 
fixed-effects estimator is therefore a natural choice in this study.
23
 
Last but not least, given changes in Russian corporate governance 
over the period under study, we conduct separate analysis for two sub-
samples, 1998-2002 and 2003-2009. The borderline of 2002/2003 splits the 
sample into two almost equal parts; moreover, the Russian Corporate Gov-
ernance Code was adopted in 2002. The estimation results for the two sub-
samples and the voting premium (computed using both imputed share pric-
es and prices registered in actual transactions) are shown in Appendix 3. 
While there are some differences across the results in different columns 
(some coefficients are not statistically significant due to the paucity of de-
grees of freedom), our main conclusions stay intact. Independent and non-
executive directors are associated with larger PBC, director ownership mit-
igates governance problems, and medium sized boards seem to be most ef-
fective. 
5.2. Results for traditional measures of corporate performance 
Table 6 shows the estimation results for the market-based corporate 
performance measures chosen, Market-to-Book ratio and Tobin’s Q. As in 
the case of the voting premium, we use the log transformation of the de-
pendent variables which makes their distribution more symmetric. For 
space reasons, we only report the results for specifications similar to those 
contained in Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4. Columns 1-3 contain regres-
sions for the Market-to-Book ratio and Columns 4-6 for Tobin’s Q. The re-
sults indicate no statistically significant relationship between the market-
based measures on the one hand, and board size and composition on the 
other. This is in sharp contrast to what we observe for the voting premium. 
The only statistically significant effect pertains to board ownership. It im-
plies an inverted U-shaped pattern with the peak of company performance 
at 4-5% ownership stake by directors. This turning point is quite far in the 
right tail of the distribution of board ownership (as already noted, the 95% 
percentile is 2.19). It is therefore more appropriate to interpret this result as 
a positive effect of board ownership on market-based performance 
measures with some curvature. Overall, this particular finding is consistent 
with a similar result for the voting premium. Director ownership reduces 
private benefits of control and enhances firm value. Similarly to the results 
for the voting premium, these findings are not affected by the use of im-
puted stock prices in lieu of prices registered in actual transactions.  
 Regression results for contemporaneous accounting measures as the 
dependent variables are provided in Table 7.  For space reasons, we only 
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show the estimation results for specifications similar to those reported in 
Columns 2 and 6 of Table 4 and only report the coefficients on the key var-
iables of interest.
 24
 Few coefficients are statistically significant in these re-
gressions. There is some evidence of a non-linear relationship between 
board size and ROE (Column 2) as well as of a positive relationship be-
tween the share of non-executives and SGA. The results are quite weak 
though. The quadratic function in board size implies the peak of perfor-
mance (ROE) at about 13 directors, which is broadly in line with the re-
sults for private benefits of control.  
 Table 8 provides estimates for accounting-based performance 
measures one year ahead. The specifications are the same as in Table 7. 
But the results in Table 8 are considerably richer than those in Table 7. In 
particular, regressions with ROE and ROA imply positive effects of inde-
pendent and other non-executive directors on corporate performance. 
Quantitatively, increasing the share of independent directors by 10 per-
centage points (e.g., adding an extra independent director to a board with 
10 members) is associated with an increase in ROE by 0.01, or 1 percent-
age point. The effect on ROA is smaller in magnitude, about 0.8 percent-
age points. This result for independent directors is also confirmed in the 
regression with SGA. In particular, an extra independent director in a 
board with 10 members is associated with a decline of SGA by 0.4 per-
centage points. These findings, suggesting positive roles of independent 
and other non-executive directors in corporate governance, are in sharp 
contrast with the results for the voting premium. Those earlier results im-
ply that the appointment of independent/non-executive directors is associ-
ated with larger private benefits of control, and hence greater expropriation 
of minority investors. Next, in Column 2 we observe statistically signifi-
cant coefficients on the quadratic in board size. The estimates suggest the 
peak of performance at about 12 directors, but this result is fairly weak and 
is not supported in the other regressions in Table 8. Finally, there is some 
evidence of an inverted U-shaped pattern for director ownership. The re-
gression in Column 2 (and, to a lesser extent the regression in Column 6) 
implies the peak of performance (measured by accounting ratios) at about 
3% director ownership.  
5.3. Results discussion 
There are five principal findings in our analysis. First, board structure 
and composition is linked with the voting premium much stronger than 
with traditional measures of corporate performance, whether market-based 
or accounting-based. Second, board size exhibits a non-linear relationship 
with firm performance. Both small and very large boards turn out to be less 
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effective than medium-sized ones. Third, increasing the share of non-
executive and independent directors is associated with larger private bene-
fits of control. Fourth, the results for non-executive and independent direc-
tors duffer across the performance measures chosen. The presence of these 
directors on corporate boards seems to be associated with higher profitabil-
ity, but also with greater private benefits of control. No effect on the mar-
ket-based indicators is found. Fifth, director ownership seems to play a 
positive role in corporate governance. Below we offer a tentative interpre-
tation of these findings. 
(i) Strong effect of board variables on the voting premium. In the 
voting premium regressions, many governance variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels. However, only few of these variables 
are significant in the regressions with the traditional performance indica-
tors. We believe these results reflect the fact that our key dependent varia-
ble can be regarded as a direct measure of governance problems in firms 
while market-based or accounting-based performance indicators cannot. 
By construction, the key dependent variable eliminates, or differences 
away, many idiosyncratic factors that affect traditional indicators of corpo-
rate performance, an oil price shock being a good example (see footnote 9). 
Regarding traditional performance measures per se, our results are con-
sistent with some previous research, for example, Conyon and Peck (1998) 
who found it easier to isolate the effects of board size and composition for 
ROE and more difficult for market based performance indicators. 
 (ii) Non-linear effect of board size on corporate performance. 
The inverted U-shaped pattern with the peak of corporate performance at 
about 11 board members is in line with the notion of the optimal board size, 
proposed in Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). The pattern 
found in our study is also similar to the recent empirical findings in Andres 
and Vallelado (2008) as well as in Coles et al. (2008). All in all, our result 
is in accord with the idea that large boards are ineffective in monitoring 
managers because of coordination problems and director free-riding (Yer-
mack 1996, Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998); it is also consistent 
with the literature suggesting potential flaws of small boards, such as 
greater involvement of CEOs in selecting directors (e.g., Shivdasani and 
Yermack 1999) or the lack of capacity (Jensen 1993). We believe these 
earlier findings are reinforced by our study in a non-trivial way because 
our key dependent variable captures the essence of governance problems in 
firms. 
There is one caveat though. Our results refer to the predominantly 
two-tier boards in Russia. It is still to be seen whether there is a similar 
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non-linear relationship between board size and PBC in the context of one-
tier boards. 
(iii) Positive association of non-executive and independent direc-
tors with PBC. This is the central finding of our study. Appointing non-
executive and independent directors does not seem to help protect minority 
investors from expropriation by managers and/or large shareholders in the 
emerging economy of Russia.
25
 One possible interpretation, which is not 
unique to Russia though, is that formally independent directors may not be 
independent in reality. For example, Hoitash (2011) suggests that while 
board members can adhere to the formal independence rules and regula-
tions, they can still be related to management at the social level. Black et al. 
(2012) even argues that independent and non-executive directors in emerg-
ing markets can be selected by managers and/or controlling shareholders to 
provide cover for self-dealing. Indeed, a recent survey of board practices in 
Russia conducted by PwC (2012) shows the lack of clear and transparent 
norms and procedures for the nomination and appointment of independent 
directors. There is also abundant casual evidence that most formally inde-
pendent directors are nominated by and pursue the interests of large share-
holders in Russia (e.g., Finans 2010). Alternatively, independent directors 
(when appointed, for example, by minority shareholders thanks to cumula-
tive voting) may face severe constraints in accessing and processing de-
tailed information about the firm’s operations. Information constraints 
make them powerless vis-a-vis those in control over the company. 
(iv) Difference in the results for PBC and traditional (accounting) 
performance measures. Our primary explanation draws essentially on the 
same arguments as in (iii). For example, managers and/or controlling 
shareholders who appoint formally independent directors with the purpose 
to please the stock market while extracting PBC may simultaneously en-
gage in earnings management activities. Alternatively, truly independent 
directors appointed by minority shareholders may be powerless in control-
ling earnings management under concentrated ownership. Indeed, while 
many studies show that earnings management decreases with board inde-
pendence (e.g., Peasnell, Pope and Young 2005), this is not necessarily so 
in the case of concentrated ownership (Park and Shin 2004). We believe 
that the association between earnings management and PBC is an issue de-
serving further research. 
 (v) Director ownership helps mitigate corporate governance 
problems. This result is in line with numerous studies suggesting incentive 
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alignment effects of director ownership. Although much of the relevant lit-
erature deals with CEO ownership as well as ownership by other execu-
tives, there is also evidence regarding non-executive directors. Already 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) noted that ownership-related incentives 
may work for non-executives as well as for executives. This was confirmed 
in Mura (2007) and Ozkan (2009), among others. The non-linearity in the 
relationship between director ownership and corporate performance, of 
which we find some evidence, is consistent with the entrenchment effect, 
also widely documented in the literature. Importantly, our finding provides 
some hope for non-executive directors, as their share ownership helps mit-
igate their otherwise negative effect on corporate performance measured by 
PBC. 
6. Conclusion 
After several decades of intensive research, the available evidence the 
role of board size and composition in corporate governance is far from 
conclusive. Contradictory findings are particularly common in studies that 
relate board characteristics to traditional measures of corporate perfor-
mance, such as Tobin’s Q and ROE. Recently, a growing body of research 
focuses on other indicators of board effectiveness, such as board processes 
and decisions (Bebchuck and Weisbach 2010, Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 
2013). 
In this paper we study how characteristics of corporate boards are re-
lated to private benefits of control (PBC), which can be regarded as a direct 
measure of governance problems in firms (Dyck and Zingales 2004). We 
take advantage of a unique institutional setting in Russia, where a reliable 
measure of PBC is available for a large and non-selected sample of dual 
class stock companies. The use of PBC is the key strength of our paper rel-
ative to the existing literature. Another strength of our analysis is that we 
compare the results for PBC with those for traditional indicators of corpo-
rate performance. 
 Based on new and hand-collected data on publicly traded companies 
with dual-class stock structure in Russia and employing fixed-effects re-
gressions, we find a quadratic relationship between PBC and board size, 
implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) boards. This 
result is substantially stronger for PBC than for traditional measures of 
corporate performance. There is also evidence that director ownership 
helps mitigate governance problems in firms. These results hold both for 
our key dependent variable measuring PBC and for traditional performance 
indicators. Most remarkably, we find that increasing the share of independ-
ent and non-executive directors on corporate boards of Russian companies 
is associated with larger PBC. It appears that most Russian firms appoint 
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non-executive and independent directors in order to provide cover for self-
dealing. 
 Our paper is among the first to study the association between board 
size and composition on the one hand, and private benefits of control on 
the other hand, and is, therefore, of an exploratory nature. As such, it may 
have a number of limitations. One limitation is that our results do not nec-
essarily imply causal relationships. In particular, they may be influenced 
by omitted variables and reversed causation. Indeed, endogeneity of board 
size has long been acknowledged as an important problem in empirical 
studies (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Beiner et al. 2004; Harris and Ra-
viv 2008). Although fixed effects specifications, which our study is based 
upon, take care of some of these issues, they do not address the problem in 
its entirety. Identification of causal effects would require natural experi-
ments and/or strong and valid instruments for a group of variables charac-
terizing corporate boards, which are not available to us. 
Another limitation is related to the external validity of our study, 
which focuses on a single country. Although Russia is an important emerg-
ing market and has recently been regarded as a promising testing ground 
for economic theories (Dyck et al. 2008), one cannot automatically gener-
alize from its experiences to other economies. This is a general problem 
highlighted in Black et al. (2012) who note that optimal governance may 
differ not only between developed and emerging markets, but also between 
different emerging markets. We conclude by observing that further evi-
dence from other stock markets on how board characteristics are related to 
private benefits of control is highly desirable. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Observations by Year. 
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Figure 3. Dynamics of the Average Voting Premium. 
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Table 1. Definitions of Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis. 
 Variable Description 
 Dependent variable 
VP Voting premium, calculated based on imputed share prices (0.5 times the ask price 
plus 0.5 times the bid price) averaged over May-August of each year.*  
Market-to-Book ratio The ratio of the market to book value of a firm’s equity. The market value of equity 
is estimated using imputed prices, as in the case of the voting premium.  
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q, proxied by the ratio of the market value of equity plus book value of 
long-term debt and the book value of equity and long-term debt. The market value 
of equity is estimated using imputed prices, as in the case of the voting premium. 
ROE Return on equity, calculated as the ratio of net profit to book value of equity. 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as the ratio of taxable profit to book value of equity. 
SGA Sales, general, and administration expenses divided by sales revenues. 
 Vector X variables 
Board_size Number of directors. 
Non-exec_share Percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
Independ_share Percentage of independent directors on the board. 
Dir_ownership Ownership stake of the board members excluding the CEO, percent. 
Board_sh_men Percent of male directors on the board. 
Manag_board Dummy variable for the presence of management board as opposed to the CEO on-
ly. 
CEO_legalp Dummy variable for a legal person (“managing organization”) performing the role 
of the CEO. 
CEO_tenure CEO tenure, full years. 
CEO_ownership Ownership stake of the CEO, percent. 
 Vector Z/W variables 
Size Firm size, the natural logarithm of the number of workers. 
Leverage Firm leverage, the ratio of book values of debt and equity. 
Owner1 Ownership stake of the largest shareholder. 
Owner2 Ownership stake of the second largest shareholder. 
State ownership Ownership stake by the state. 
Shapley Shapley value; characterizes the extent to which a small atomistic shareholder can 
be pivotal in a control fight over the firm.** 
Share_voting Share of common (voting) stocks in equity. 
Dividend10 Dummy for the presence of the 10% dividend rule on preferred shares (does the 
corporate charter requires the firm to pay 10% of net profit as dividend on pref. 
shares? 0=No, 1=Yes). 
Delta_dividend Extra dividend paid on preferred shares divided by their price. 
ADR Dummy for the issue of ADR (has the firm issued any ADR? 0=No, 1=Yes). 
Vote Dummy for enfranchisement of preferred shares in the current year, occurs when the 
company did not pay dividends on pref. shares in the previous year (are the pre-
ferred shares of the firm voting in the current year? 0=No, 1=Yes). 
Veto Dummy for the existence of the veto power for preferred shareholders.(equals 1, if 
the corporate charter includes the veto power, 0 – otherwise). 
Liquidity_comm The variable measures the liquidity of common stocks (calculated as aver-
age_bid/average_ask over May-August for each year. The closer this variable to 1, 
the more liquid the stock is. When it is close to 0, the stock is illiquid). 
Liquidity_pref The variable measures the liquidity of preferred stocks (calculated as aver-
age_bid/average_ask over May-August for each year. The closer this variable to 1, 
the more liquid the stock is. When it’s close to 0, the stock is illiquid). 
* This approach is chosen due to the infrequent trading of many Russian stocks. It is de-
scribed and carefully analyzed in Muravyev (2013). 
** The Shapley value is computed based on detailed ownership data for the sampled 
companies and using the online software for voting power analysis provided by Dennis Leech 
and Robert Leech, http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae, as available on January 28, 2013. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
variable mean sd min p50 max 
 Dependent variables 
VP 1.13 0.88 0.06 0.91 5.08 
Market-to-Book 1.02 1.21 0.02 0.64 7.61 
Tobin’s Q 0.98 1.04 0.02 0.73 7.47 
ROE 0.09 0.15 -0.46 0.05 1.06 
ROA 0.09 0.11 -0.21 0.06 0.58 
SGA 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.59 
 Key corporate governance variables (vector X) 
Board_size 8.80 2.10 5.00 9.00 19.00 
Non_exec_share 0.57 0.20 0.00 0.57 1.00 
Independ_share 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.78 
Dir_ownership 0.51 1.82 0.00 0.01 16.19 
Board_sh_men 0.87 0.14 0.33 0.88 1.00 
Manag_board 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CEO_legalp 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CEO_tenure 3.55 3.24 0.00 3.00 25.00 
CEO_ownership 0.42 1.14 0.00 0.01 13.68 
 Control variables (vectors Z/W) 
Size 8.45 1.35 4.06 8.48 11.71 
Leverage 1.03 1.54 0.06 0.43 8.29 
Owner1 54.70 14.17 7.17 52.05 99.49 
Owner2 14.90 7.84 0.00 14.07 41.91 
State ownership 3.32 10.93 0.00 0.00 99.59 
Shapley 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.84 
Share_voting 0.79 0.06 0.75 0.75 1.00 
Dividend10 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Delta_dividend 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.28 
ADR 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Vote 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Veto 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Liquidity_comm 0.64 0.27 0.01 0.69 0.99 
Liquidity_pref 0.54 0.30 0.01 0.57 0.99 
Note: the number of observations is 1021 for most variables. 
The minimum is 918 for the stock-market-based performance 
measures. For some companies included in the RTS, there were no 
transactions with either common or preferred shares over May-
August in a given year, as well as no ask and/or bid quotations for 
a particular class of shares. This prevents imputation of share pric-
es and computation of the market-based indicators, including the 
voting premium.  
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Table 3. Pairwise Correlations between the Dependent Variables. 
 VP M-t-B Tobin’s Q ROE ROA SGA ROE t+1 
ROA 
t+1 
Market-to-Book -0.17*        
 (0.00)        
Tobin’s Q -0.16* 0.96*       
 (0.00) (0.00)       
ROE -0.06 0.40* 0.38*      
 (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)      
ROA -0.05 0.28* 0.27* 0.76*     
 (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
SGA -0.01 0.31* 0.33* 0.24* 0.13*    
 (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
ROE t+1 -0.06 0.37* 0.34* 0.41* 0.34* 0.19*   
 (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
ROA t+1 0.02 0.27* 0.25* 0.44* 0.53* 0.10* 0.74*  
 (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
SGA t+1 -0.02 0.36* 0.35* 0.21* 0.14* 0.89* 0.21* 0.12* 
 (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
* Significance levels are shown in parentheses beneath the correlation 
coefficients. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 4. Estimation Results for the Voting Premium. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board_size -0.026 -0.355** -0.357** -0.360** -0.327** 
-
0.328** 
 (0.033) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.147) (0.147) 
Board_size^2  1.443** 1.446** 1.470*** 1.313** 1.313** 
  (0.561) (0.556) (0.556) (0.573) (0.574) 
Non_exec_share 0.472* 0.493** 0.504** 0.492* 0.475** 0.476** 
 (0.249) (0.248) (0.249) (0.252) (0.240) (0.239) 
Independ_share 0.833*** 0.851*** 0.854*** 0.820** 0.767** 0.771** 
 (0.312) (0.316) (0.318) (0.323) (0.327) (0.326) 
Board_sh_men   0.151 0.154 0.169 0.166 
   (0.239) (0.238) (0.239) (0.240) 
Dir_ownership   0.024 -0.078 -0.071 -0.068 
   (0.022) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) 
Dir_ownership^2    1.184** 1.107* 1.091* 
    (0.579) (0.599) (0.593) 
Manag_board     -0.302* -0.304* 
     (0.170) (0.170) 
CEO_legalp     0.251 0.250 
     (0.181) (0.181) 
CEO_tenure     0.009 0.010 
     (0.010) (0.011) 
CEO_ownership     0.008 -0.038 
     (0.024) (0.110) 
CEO_ownership^2      0.577 
      (1.188) 
R2 0.403 0.409 0.410 0.411 0.420 0.420 
N 907 907 907 907 907 907 
Note: The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP, comput-
ed using imputed prices based on ask and bid quotations on the RTS. 
The results are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. The table on-
ly reports the key variables of interest. Control variables that are not 
shown include: firm size (Size), Shapley value (Shapley), share of vot-
ing shares outstanding (Share_voting), presence of the 10% dividend 
on preferred stock (Dividend10), difference in dividends between non-
voting and voting stocks (Delta_dividend), dummy for ADR issue 
(ADR), dummy for temporary enfranchisement of preferred stock 
(Vote), dummy for the vetoing power of preferred shareholders on cor-
porate charter changes (Veto), measures of liquidity of the two classes 
of stock (Liquidity_common, Liquidity_pref), as well as time dummies. 
Industry dummy variables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects. Clus-
ter-robust standard errors with clustering on firms are reported in paren-
theses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Estimation Results for the Voting Premium Computed Using 
Share Prices from Actual Transactions. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board_size -0.004 -0.298* -0.330* -0.331* -0.462** -0.480** 
 (0.053) (0.177) (0.180) (0.183) (0.188) (0.189) 
Board_size^2  1.267* 1.497* 1.503* 2.019** 2.076** 
  (0.758) (0.767) (0.769) (0.792) (0.798) 
Non_exec_share 0.568 0.602 0.669 0.668 0.752* 0.718* 
 (0.418) (0.426) (0.424) (0.432) (0.411) (0.406) 
Independ_share 0.981* 1.014* 1.086* 1.085* 1.308** 1.293** 
 (0.572) (0.580) (0.589) (0.603) (0.556) (0.555) 
Board_sh_men   -0.551 -0.551 -0.571 -0.583 
   (0.531) (0.532) (0.514) (0.513) 
Dir_ownership   -0.278*** -0.289 -0.408 -0.569 
   (0.101) (0.299) (0.305) (0.387) 
Dir_ownership^2    0.659 8.641 18.605 
    (13.056) (13.291) (18.522) 
Manag_board     -0.151 -0.172 
     (0.254) (0.259) 
CEO_legalp     -0.310 -0.346 
     (0.255) (0.250) 
CEO_tenure     0.029 0.031* 
     (0.018) (0.018) 
CEO_ownership     0.009 -0.257 
     (0.140) (0.301) 
CEO_ownership^2      16.756 
      (13.794) 
R2 0.626 0.629 0.640 0.640 0.658 0.660 
N 275 275 275 275 275 275 
Note: The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP, comput-
ed using prices registered in actual transactions on the RTS. The results 
are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. The table only reports 
the key variables of interest. Control variables that are not shown in-
clude: firm size (Size), Shapley value (Shapley), share of voting shares 
outstanding (Share_voting), presence of the 10% dividend on preferred 
stock (Dividend10), difference in dividends between non-voting and 
voting stocks (Delta_dividend), dummy for ADR issue (ADR), dummy 
for temporary enfranchisement of preferred stock (Vote), dummy for 
the vetoing power of preferred shareholders on corporate charter 
changes (Veto), measures of liquidity of the two classes of stock (Li-
quidity_common, Liquidity_pref), as well as time dummies. Industry 
dummy variables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects. Cluster-robust 
standard errors with clustering on firms are reported in parentheses. As-
terisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Estimation Results for Market-based Performance Measures. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Market-to-Book ratio Tobin’s Q 
Board_size -0.044 -0.037 -0.014 -0.137 -0.136 -0.107 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.115) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) 
Board_size^2 0.265 0.217 0.095 0.592 0.565 0.413 
 (0.455) (0.448) (0.449) (0.476) (0.473) (0.474) 
Non_exec_share 0.080 0.088 0.055 -0.041 -0.023 -0.077 
 (0.276) (0.274) (0.268) (0.180) (0.178) (0.172) 
Independ_share 0.335 0.371 0.327 0.140 0.176 0.099 
 (0.336) (0.336) (0.341) (0.235) (0.234) (0.232) 
Board_sh_men  -0.154 -0.154  -0.071 -0.063 
  (0.216) (0.212)  (0.194) (0.186) 
Dir_ownership  0.129* 0.116  0.147*** 0.128** 
  (0.068) (0.071)  (0.051) (0.050) 
Dir_ownership^2  -1.569* -1.472*  -1.358*** -1.231** 
  (0.834) (0.856)  (0.504) (0.497) 
Manag_board   -0.219*   -0.312** 
   (0.129)   (0.125) 
CEO_legalp   0.109   0.206 
   (0.151)   (0.147) 
CEO_tenure   -0.006   -0.010 
   (0.012)   (0.010) 
CEO_ownership   0.074   0.133 
   (0.111)   (0.095) 
CEO_ownership^2   -0.840   -1.652 
   (1.224)   (1.068) 
R2 0.640 0.642 0.646 0.644 0.647 0.657 
N 916 916 916 916 916 916 
Note: The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio (regres-
sions 1 to 3) and Tobin’s Q (regressions 4 to 6). The results are ob-
tained using the fixed-effects estimator. The table only reports the key 
variables of interest. Control variables that are not shown include: firm 
size (Size), leverage (Leverage), ownership stakes of the first and sec-
ond largest shareholders (Owner1, Owner2), ownership stake of the 
state (State), as well as time dummies. Industry dummy variables are 
subsumed in the firm fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors with 
clustering on firms are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * de-
note significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results for Contemporaneous Accounting 
Measures. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 ROE ROA SGA 
Board_size 0.044 0.051* 0.022 0.027 0.006 0.007 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) 
Board_size^2 -0.169 -0.200* -0.078 -0.103 -0.016 -0.021 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.078) (0.076) (0.028) (0.030) 
Non_exec_share 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.023 0.027* 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.030) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) 
Independ_share 0.088 0.076 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.034 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.045) (0.044) (0.026) (0.027) 
Board_sh_men  0.049  0.013  0.010 
  (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.024) 
Dir_ownership  0.016  -0.009  0.004 
  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.004) 
Dir_ownership^2  -0.302  0.041  -0.013 
  (0.287)  (0.135)  (0.042) 
Manag_board  -0.035*  -0.025  0.001 
  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
CEO_legalp  0.031*  0.003  -0.007 
  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.007) 
CEO_tenure  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CEO_ownership  0.012  0.006  0.014* 
  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.008) 
CEO_ownership^
2 
 -0.066  0.046  -0.168 
  (0.285)  (0.193)  (0.107) 
R2 0.099 0.113 0.137 0.147 0.166 0.172 
N 979 979 989 989 993 993 
Note: The dependent variable is contemporaneous ROE (regres-
sions 1 and 2), ROA (regressions 3 and 4), and SGA (regressions 5 and 
6). The results are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. The table 
only reports the key variables of interest. Control variables that are not 
shown include: firm size (Size), leverage (Leverage), ownership stakes 
of the first and second largest shareholders (Owner1, Owner2), owner-
ship stake of the state (State), as well as time dummies. Industry dum-
my variables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects. Cluster-robust 
standard errors with clustering on firms are reported in parentheses. As-
terisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
42 
 
Table 8. Estimation Results for Accounting Measures at Time t+1. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 ROE ROA SGA 
Board_size 0.045 0.053* 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.005 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.018) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) 
Board_size^2 -0.174 -0.215* -0.013 -0.039 -0.023 -0.012 
 (0.133) (0.123) (0.079) (0.067) (0.026) (0.027) 
Non_exec_share 0.052 0.068* 0.063 0.071* -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.014) (0.015) 
Independ_share 0.092* 0.112** 0.074 0.086* -0.044* -0.049** 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.048) (0.044) (0.023) (0.025) 
Board_sh_men  0.094*  0.065*  -0.014 
  (0.055)  (0.034)  (0.022) 
Dir_ownership  0.023*  0.006  -0.008 
  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Dir_ownership^2  -0.364**  -0.128  0.171** 
  (0.175)  (0.090)  (0.066) 
Manag_board  -0.012  -0.026  0.009 
  (0.030)  (0.017)  (0.012) 
CEO_legalp  -0.048**  -0.044**  0.011 
  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.012) 
CEO_tenure  -0.001  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CEO_ownership  0.022  0.014  0.010 
  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.009) 
CEO_ownership^2  -0.165  -0.173  -0.160 
  (0.209)  (0.146)  (0.122) 
R2 0.103 0.124 0.067 0.097 0.156 0.181 
N 891 891 902 902 897 897 
Note: The dependent variable is one-year-ahead values of ROE 
(regressions 1 and 2), ROA (regressions 3 and 4), and SGA (regres-
sions 5 and 6). The results are obtained using the fixed-effects estima-
tor. The table only reports the key variables of interest. Control varia-
bles that are not shown include: firm size (Size), leverage (Leverage), 
ownership stakes of the first and second largest shareholders (Owner1, 
Owner2), ownership stake of the state (State), as well as time dummies. 
Industry dummy variables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects. Clus-
ter-robust standard errors with clustering on firms are reported in paren-
theses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 1. Identification of Non-executive and Independent Directors. 
In classifying directors as non-executive and independent we rely on 
quarterly reports (typically from the second quarter) of the sampled com-
panies and additional sources, such as business newspapers and the Inter-
net. Although quarterly reports do not directly identify independent and 
non-executive directors, they provide a wealth of information regarding di-
rectors’ current and past positions within the firm and outside, including in 
its affiliated organizations, as well as regarding their ownership stake in the 
firm. 
Based on this information, we classify a director as non-executive if 
she currently does not hold a managerial position in the firm. This can be 
easily seen in the quarterly reports, as they list all current positions of the 
board members. Identification of independent directors is less straightfor-
ward. We rely on the definition in the Corporate Governance Code, which 
lists seven criteria that an independent director should meet (see FCSM 
2002, article 2.2.2). For example, an independent director cannot be a 
manager or an employee of the company or an officer or an employee of 
the managing organization; she also cannot be an affiliated person of the 
company or its affiliates; and she cannot be a representative of the state.  
 Our algorithm involves several steps. We first identify non-executive 
directors. Within this group, we then check if a director (a) has any owner-
ship stake in the company, (b) is a public servant, (c) sits on the company’s 
board longer than seven years, (d) holds a managerial position in any of the 
company’s affiliated firms, (e) is affiliated with the managing organization 
(where relevant). A positive answer to any of these items implies that the 
director cannot be regarded as independent. Finally, in a few uncertain cas-
es we resort to additional sources such as business newspapers (Kommer-
sant, Vedomosti) and the Internet. 
 For example, the board of directors of company LOMO in 1998 had 
5 directors, of which two were LOMO managers. The other three could be 
classified as non-executives. Among them, one had a managerial position 
in the firm that was among the company’s principal shareholders. Hence, 
he could not be regarded as independent. According to the information 
provided in LOMO quarterly reports, the other two fulfilled the formal cri-
teria for director independence specified in the Corporate Governance 
Code. In particular, they both held managerial positions in firms that were 
not listed among LOMO affiliated persons. However, simple search in the 
archives of newspaper Kommersant identified links (via ownership) be-
tween LOMO and these other two companies. Thus, neither of LOMO di-
rectors was independent in 1998. 
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 Note that for the ease of interpretation, independent and non-
executive categories do not overlap in our data. Directors who are inde-
pendent are not considered non-executive. 
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Appendix 2. Estimation Results for the Voting Premium Using the 
Random-effects Estimator. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board_size -0.034 -0.031 -0.032 -0.034 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.025) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) (0.125) (0.126) 
Board_size^2  -0.015 -0.012 -0.003 -0.104 -0.106 
  (0.562) (0.564) (0.565) (0.588) (0.592) 
Non_exec_share 0.338* 0.336 0.337* 0.336 0.329 0.335 
 (0.201) (0.205) (0.204) (0.205) (0.204) (0.204) 
Independ_share 0.567** 0.565** 0.568** 0.562** 0.569** 0.571** 
 (0.233) (0.234) (0.235) (0.237) (0.238) (0.238) 
Board_sh_men   -0.030 -0.030 -0.046 -0.043 
   (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.209) 
Dir_ownership   0.000 -0.015 -0.014 -0.020 
   (0.012) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) 
Dir_ownership^2    0.119 0.111 0.150 
    (0.264) (0.250) (0.259) 
Manag_board     -0.053 -0.054 
     (0.118) (0.119) 
CEO_legalp     -0.059 -0.058 
     (0.127) (0.127) 
CEO_tenure     0.006 0.006 
     (0.009) (0.009) 
CEO_ownership     -0.011 0.009 
     (0.014) (0.037) 
CEO_ownership^
2 
     -0.209 
      (0.305) 
Hausman test:       
Chi2 28.75 93.34 112.43 313.36 105.40 100.40 
Prob>Chi2 0.2299 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.393 0.393 
N 907 907 907 907 907 907 
Note: The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP, comput-
ed using imputed prices based on ask and bid quotations on the RTS. 
The results are obtained using the random-effects estimator. The table 
only reports the key variables of interest. Control variables that are not 
shown include: firm size (Size), Shapley value (Shapley), share of vot-
ing shares outstanding (Share_voting), presence of the 10% dividend 
on preferred stock (Dividend10), difference in dividends between non-
voting and voting stocks (Delta_dividend), dummy for ADR issue 
(ADR), dummy for temporary enfranchisement of preferred stock 
(Vote), dummy for the vetoing power of preferred shareholders on cor-
porate charter changes (Veto), measures of liquidity of the two classes 
of stock (Liquidity_common, Liquidity_pref), as well as time and in-
dustry dummies. Cluster-robust standard errors with clustering on firms 
are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The Hausman specification 
test is reported at the foot of the table. 
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Appendix 3. Estimation Results for the Subsamples Spanning 1998-
2002 and 2003-2009 (before and after adoption of the Corporate Gov-
ernance Code). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 1998-2002, imputed 
stock prices 
1998-2002, actual 
stock prices 
2003-2009, imputed 
stock prices 
2003-2009, actual 
stock prices 
Board_size -0.070 -0.058 -0.131 -0.062 -0.505* -0.555** 0.021 -0.115 
 (0.232) (0.218) (0.508) (0.571) (0.255) (0.240) (0.370) (0.462) 
Board_size^2 0.240 0.207 0.398 0.207 2.297** 2.428** 0.258 0.762 
 (0.849) (0.801) (2.201) (2.461) (1.060) (1.001) (1.471) (1.816) 
Non_exec_share 0.583** 0.521** 0.749 0.561 0.376 0.247 1.068** 0.843* 
 (0.262) (0.252) (0.938) (0.641) (0.430) (0.425) (0.455) (0.476) 
Independ_share 1.327*** 1.156*** 0.183 -0.235 0.462 0.309 1.714*** 1.716*** 
 (0.435) (0.432) (1.513) (1.508) (0.500) (0.495) (0.514) (0.528) 
Board_sh_men  0.543*  4.694***  0.272  0.423 
  (0.300)  (0.747)  (0.340)  (0.531) 
Dir_ownership  -0.065  -0.216  -0.268**  -0.488 
  (0.066)  (0.503)  (0.134)  (0.455) 
Dir_ownership^2  0.714  4.043  3.376**  -0.979 
  (0.621)  (17.603)  (1.309)  (22.006) 
Manag_board  -0.139  0.293  -0.632**  -0.446 
  (0.198)  (0.225)  (0.250)  (0.553) 
CEO_legalp  0.669**  0.405  -0.009  -0.602** 
  (0.259)  (0.288)  (0.233)  (0.287) 
CEO_tenure  0.019  -0.009  0.004  0.026 
  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
CEO_ownership  -0.051  0.597**  -0.144  -0.435 
  (0.142)  (0.293)  (0.229)  (0.801) 
CEO_ownership^2  0.841  -18.380  0.814  45.019 
  (2.198)  (12.204)  (2.337)  (60.179) 
R2 0.276 0.304 0.548 0.713 0.314 0.340 0.485 0.543 
N 468 468 110 110 439 439 165 165 
Note: The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP, computed us-
ing imputed prices based on ask and bid quotations on the RTS (columns 1, 
2, 5, and 6) and using prices registered in actual transactions on the RTS 
(columns 3, 4, 7, and 8). The results are obtained using the fixed-effects esti-
mator. The table only reports the key variables of interest. Control variables 
that are not shown include: firm size (Size), Shapley value (Shapley), share 
of voting shares outstanding (Share_voting), presence of the 10% dividend 
on preferred stock (Dividend10), difference in dividends between non-voting 
and voting stocks (Delta_dividend), dummy for ADR issue (ADR), dummy 
for temporary enfranchisement of preferred stock (Vote), dummy for the ve-
toing power of preferred shareholders on corporate charter changes (Veto), 
measures of liquidity of the two classes of stock (Liquidity_common, Liquid-
ity_pref), as well as time dummies. Industry dummy variables are subsumed 
in the firm fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors with clustering on 
firms are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 4. Estimation Results for the Voting Premium (full results 
for Table 4). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board_size -0.026 -0.355** -0.357** -0.360** -0.327** -0.328** 
 (0.033) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.147) (0.147) 
Board_size^2  1.443** 1.446** 1.470*** 1.313** 1.313** 
  (0.561) (0.556) (0.556) (0.573) (0.574) 
Non_exec_share 0.472* 0.493** 0.504** 0.492* 0.475** 0.476** 
 (0.249) (0.248) (0.249) (0.252) (0.240) (0.239) 
Independ_share 0.833*** 0.851*** 0.854*** 0.820** 0.767** 0.771** 
 (0.312) (0.316) (0.318) (0.323) (0.327) (0.326) 
Board_sh_men   0.151 0.154 0.169 0.166 
   (0.239) (0.238) (0.239) (0.240) 
Dir_ownership   0.024 -0.078 -0.071 -0.068 
   (0.022) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) 
Dir_ownership^2    1.184** 1.107* 1.091* 
    (0.579) (0.599) (0.593) 
Manag_board     -0.302* -0.304* 
     (0.170) (0.170) 
CEO_legalp     0.251 0.250 
     (0.181) (0.181) 
CEO_tenure     0.009 0.010 
     (0.010) (0.011) 
CEO_ownership     0.008 -0.038 
     (0.024) (0.110) 
CEO_ownership^2      0.577 
      (1.188) 
Shapley 0.490 0.313 0.349 0.341 0.251 0.257 
 (0.331) (0.340) (0.332) (0.339) (0.348) (0.347) 
1/Share_voting -0.398 -0.792 -0.701 -0.788 -0.775 -0.824 
 (2.067) (2.066) (2.031) (2.037) (2.023) (2.013) 
Dividend10 0.202 0.221 0.206 0.213 0.195 0.195 
 (0.342) (0.328) (0.325) (0.323) (0.327) (0.328) 
Delta_dividend -0.433 -0.422 -0.441 -0.473 -0.457 -0.460 
 (0.456) (0.460) (0.462) (0.463) (0.446) (0.445) 
ADR -0.190* -0.179* -0.173* -0.165* -0.151 -0.150 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.095) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) 
Vote 0.123 0.134 0.137 0.142 0.132 0.129 
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) 
Veto 0.116 0.119 0.123 0.111 0.164 0.162 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) 
Liquidity_comm 0.686*** 0.677*** 0.664*** 0.676*** 0.668*** 0.670*** 
 (0.199) (0.198) (0.203) (0.203) (0.205) (0.206) 
Liquidity_pref -0.834*** -0.824*** -0.822*** -0.832*** -0.859*** -0.859*** 
 (0.207) (0.208) (0.209) (0.208) (0.209) (0.209) 
Size -0.122* -0.103 -0.108 -0.108 -0.100 -0.101 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071) 
Year1998 -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.240*** -0.237*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) 
Year1999 -0.065 -0.062 -0.057 -0.066 -0.078 -0.077 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) 
Year2000 -0.063 -0.047 -0.039 -0.046 -0.048 -0.049 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) 
Year2001 -0.687*** -0.680*** -0.667*** -0.679*** -0.737*** -0.739*** 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) 
Year2002 -0.797*** -0.784*** -0.774*** -0.784*** -0.852*** -0.855*** 
 (0.164) (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.168) (0.169) 
Year2003 -1.081*** -1.048*** -1.039*** -1.052*** -1.119*** -1.124*** 
 (0.150) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.147) (0.147) 
Year2004 -1.033*** -1.002*** -0.988*** -1.006*** -1.073*** -1.080*** 
 (0.172) (0.173) (0.174) (0.174) (0.179) (0.179) 
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Year2005 -1.712*** -1.667*** -1.651*** -1.669*** -1.741*** -1.748*** 
 (0.150) (0.157) (0.160) (0.159) (0.163) (0.164) 
Year2006 -1.400*** -1.343*** -1.325*** -1.340*** -1.406*** -1.415*** 
 (0.168) (0.176) (0.179) (0.179) (0.187) (0.188) 
Year2007 -1.048*** -0.996*** -0.980*** -0.992*** -1.054*** -1.063*** 
 (0.181) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.195) (0.197) 
Year2008 -1.126*** -1.069*** -1.051*** -1.047*** -1.119*** -1.131*** 
 (0.174) (0.180) (0.181) (0.180) (0.188) (0.191) 
Intercept 1.719 3.722 3.523 3.670 3.497 3.585 
 (2.708) (2.535) (2.458) (2.467) (2.466) (2.454) 
R2 0.403 0.409 0.410 0.411 0.420 0.420 
N 907 907 907 907 907 907 
Note: The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP, computed 
using imputed prices based on ask and bid quotations on the RTS. The re-
sults are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. Industry dummy vari-
ables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard er-
rors with clustering on firms are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
49 
 
Appendix 5. Estimation Results for Contemporaneous Accounting 
Measures (full results for Table 7). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 ROE ROA SGA 
Board_size 0.044 0.051* 0.022 0.027 0.006 0.007 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) 
Board_size^2 -0.169 -0.200* -0.078 -0.103 -0.016 -0.021 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.078) (0.076) (0.028) (0.030) 
Non_exec_share 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.023 0.027* 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.030) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) 
Independ_share 0.088 0.076 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.034 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.045) (0.044) (0.026) (0.027) 
Board_sh_men  0.049  0.013  0.010 
  (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.024) 
Dir_ownership  0.016  -0.009  0.004 
  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.004) 
Dir_ownership^2  -0.302  0.041  -0.013 
  (0.287)  (0.135)  (0.042) 
Manag_board  -0.035*  -0.025  0.001 
  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
CEO_legalp  0.031*  0.003  -0.007 
  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.007) 
CEO_tenure  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CEO_ownership  0.012  0.006  0.014* 
  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.008) 
CEO_ownership^2  -0.066  0.046  -0.168 
  (0.285)  (0.193)  (0.107) 
Leverage -0.003 -0.004 -0.023*** -0.025*** 0.013** 0.014** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Size -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.034** -0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Owner1 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Owner2 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
State_ownership 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year1998 -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.009 -0.010* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year1999 -0.008 -0.005 -0.014* -0.015* -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year2000 -0.024** -0.021* -0.014 -0.015 0.002 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year2001 -0.040*** -0.036** 0.008 0.005 -0.016** -0.014** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) 
Year2002 -0.043** -0.041** -0.027* -0.030* -0.015*** -0.013** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year2003 -0.017 -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016** -0.014** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.008) (0.007) 
Year2004 0.002 0.009 0.004 -0.000 -0.022** -0.019** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.009) (0.008) 
Year2005 0.013 0.017 -0.005 -0.009 -0.015 -0.011 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.021) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010) 
Year2006 0.022 0.023 0.006 0.003 -0.019* -0.014 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) 
Year2007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.012) (0.011) 
Year2008 -0.044 -0.044 -0.024 -0.027 -0.018 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013) 
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Intercept -0.176 -0.211 0.001 -0.013 0.284*** 0.262** 
 (0.172) (0.175) (0.133) (0.133) (0.107) (0.111) 
r2 0.099 0.113 0.137 0.147 0.166 0.172 
N 979 979 989 989 993 993 
Note: The dependent variable is contemporaneous ROE (regressions 
1 and 2), ROA (regressions 3 and 4), and SGA (regressions 5 and 6). The 
results are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. Industry dummy 
variables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard 
errors with clustering on firms are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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